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Law, Morality, and Thoreau
By PHILIP H. RHINELANDER*

My reservations about Professor Bennett's article, The Constitution and the Moral Order,' are of two kinds. One kind pertains to the
multiplicity and variety of the relations between law and morality, of
which I think Professor Bennett takes insufficient note. Professor

Hart, in opening his lectures on Law, Liberty and Morality,2 observed
that "in the heat of the controversy often generated when law and
morals are mentioned in conjunction, it is often overlooked that there
is not just one question concerning their relations but many different
questions needing quite separate consideration."3 Instead of sorting
out causal questions, conceptual questions, and normative questions for
separate consideration, Professor Bennett lumps them together, thereby
obscuring some significant issues. It will be necessary to consider some of the main distinctions that need to be made. My second
set of reservations pertains to the relata that the relations between law
and morals are thought to connect. While the term "law" is relatively
unambiguous when applied to positive law4 (as I shall apply it unless
otherwise indicated), terms like "morality" and "moral order" have different content in different contexts. Morality, for example, may refer
to the mores of a society as practiced at a given time, or to its professed
standards, or to some other standards that are neither practiced nor professed by the society in question but are invoked by some moralist as
being required by his concept of moral rectitude. Again, if a distinction is drawn between morality and expediency, the force of that dis* Harvard, A.B., 1929; LL.B., 1932; Ph.D., 1949. Professor of Philosophy and
Humanities (emeritus), Stanford University.
1. Bennett, The Constitution and the Moral Order, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 899
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Bennett].
2. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LmERTY AND MoRALrrv (1963) [hereinafter cited as HART].
3. Id. at 1.
4. By "positive law" 'I mean actual laws, including constitutional provisions,
legislative enactments, and judicial decisions, as contrasted with ideal norms of so-called
"natural" law or "higher" law.
[919]
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tinction will vary according to the ethical outlook within which it occurs.
I do not believe Professor Bennett takes proper account of variant

meanings of this sort or of the need to consider basic differences among
ethical terms.

Both sets of difficulties come to a head over Professor Bennett's
interpretation of Thoreau. I shall therefore take that as the focus of
my discussion, hoping to call attention to some of the main issues that
need first, to be untangled, and second, to be separately identified, before any of them can be effectively dealt with. Professor Bennett's
estimate of Thoreau is as follows:
In Thoreau'% view, matters of expediency belong to the law,
while morality is found in the conscience of the individual.
His exaltation of conscience is well known. "[Alny man more right
than his neighbors," he informs us, "constitutes a majority of one.
." The moral bankruptcy of the social order is assumed: "Government," he claims, "is at best but an expedient," and Thoreau is
even "desirous . . . of being a bad subject." In believing that
law is limited to matters of nonmoral relations, Thoreau goes far
beyond the idea that law cannot create values, to the position that
the legal and moral domains are mutually exclusive.5

From this interpretation, for which Professor Bennett claims the authority of Professor Hurst, 6 he goes on to attribute to Thoreau "the
theory of the moral insignificance of the legal order";' he accuses

Thoreau of making a "categorical, simplistic dichotomy"; s he speaks of
Thoreau's "denigration of social process to mere expediency";9 and he
rejects "Thoreau's denuded Constitution."'0 This interpretation of
Thoreau strikes me as both mistaken and internally incoherent.
5. Bennett, supra note 1, at 911-12 (footnotes omitted).
6. Professor Hurst's article, Thoreau, Conscience and Law, 19 S.D.L. REV. 1
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hurst], ascribed to Thoreau a belief in the "sovereignty of
individual conscience" (id. at .8) that supposedly had the effect of "limiting uses of law
to matters merely of utilitarian expediency." Id. at 5. Hurst refers to "Thoreau's rigid
division between the domains of humane values and the domains of law" (id. at 37); and
he deplores 'Thoreau's wholesale rejection of legal processes as instruments of humane
values .... ." Id. at 38. He does not, however, as far as I can find, equate "humane
values" with the whole of morality. Hurst, like Bennett, ignores Thoreau's belief in
higher law as providing the ultimate norm to which both positive law and positive
morality ought to conform. This is, I think, a serious error, but Hurst does not make the
further mistake of excluding all considerations of utilitarian expediency from the sphere
of morals as Bennett seems to do.
7. Bennett, supra note 1, at 912.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 913.
10. Id.
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L Relations between Law and Morality
Between law and morality there is no single type of relationship.
Instead there is a variety of relations, giving rise to a multiplicity of
different but interlocking questions that can be approached from different points of view and on most of which there is room for a diversity of
views. The main types of questions may be grouped, at least roughly,
under three general headings, corresponding to the three main types of
relations or possible relations that may be the subject of inquiry:
(1) causal and functional, (2) analytical and conceptual, and (3) evaluative and normative.
1. Causal and Functional Issues
Examples of causal-functional questions are: (a) Is the development of law influenced by morals? (b) Is the development of morals
influenced by law? (c) Can a law, or a system of law, be (or remain)
effective if the moral convictions of the people as a whole fail to support
it? Inquiries of this sort call for historical and sociological evidence,
including evidence about the historical impact of moral and political
ideas. The passage from Judge Learned Hand with which Professor
Bennett begins his paper" raises questions in this regard. Professor
Bennett's discussion of the principal values of the American constitutional system 12 and their historical background also pertains to this sort
of inquiry, as does his apt observation that other societies have been
ravaged as often by decay from within as by invasion from without.
It is to be observed, however, that inquiries under this heading
do not ask whether the American constitutional system is worth preserving; that point is here taken for granted. The discussion aims at
11. Id. at 899.
12. It makes for clarity to distinguish between values and norms. Values-if
considered as comprising human needs, wants, attitudes, aspirations, and their objectsdo not, in and of themselves, provide specific standards or principles of action, which is
the function of norms. G. voNWRiGHT, NoRm AND ACTION (1961); A. Ross,
DIRECTIVES AND NoRMS 78-92 (1968). The two are, of course, closely connected. A.P.
D'Entreves has pointed out that "values must be given a 'normative' expression in order
to have a meaning."

A.P. D'ENTEvEs, NATURAL LAW: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 117

(1962). D'Entreves also observes that "[w]hat language is to thought, norms are to
values." Id. at 120. Kurt Baier argues that values constitute backing for norms, in the
sense that values provide the basis for the creation and the evaluation of norms. Baier,
What is Value?: An Analysis of the Concept, in VALUES AND THE FUTURE 33, 50-53 (K.
Bajer & N. Rescher eds. 1969). It should be noted that a norm, e.g., the rule that
promises ought to be kept, may itself have a value insofar as it is an object of approbation. If the validity of the norm is challenged, it may be defended by pointing to the
function it performs in maintaining mere basic social values.
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clarifying the kind of functional relation between law and morality that
is necessary for its preservation. I do not question the importance of
this inquiry. I agree generally that an active convergence of law and
morality is necessary to the effective functioning of any system, including our own. As Professor Lon Fuller has observed:
No written constitution can be self-executing. To be effective it
requires not merely the respectful deference we show for ordinary
legal enactments, but that willing convergence of effort we give to
moral principles in which we have an active belief. One may
properly work to amend a constitution, but so long as it remains
unamended one must work with it, not against it or around it. All
this amounts to saying that to be effective a written constitution
must13be accepted, at least provisionally, not just as law, but as good
law.
2. Analytical and Conceptual Issues

Examples of analytical-conceptual questions are: (a) Must some
reference to moral principles enter into an adequate conception or definition of law or of a legal system? (b) Is it merely a contingent fact
that law and morals often overlap and share a common vocabulary of
rights, obligations, and duties? (c) What are the appropriate criteria
for an adequate conception or definition of law or legal systems, as
such? Professor Hart (whose formulation of these questions I have
substantially adopted) notes that they "are famous questions in the long
history of the philosophy of law, but perhaps they are not so important
as the amount of time and ink expended upon them suggests.' 4 Such
questions need to be noted, however, if only to be distinguished from
other types of inquiry. I would add that familiarity with the long debates over the conceptual nature of law' 5 and legal systems, 6 between
adherents of natural law and natural rights on the one hand, and utilitarians (like Bentham and Austin), analysts (like John Chipman
Gray), pragmatists (like Pound or Learned Hand), positivists (like
13. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAMI.
L. REV. 630, 642 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Fuller], reprinted in OLAFSON, SOCIETY,
LAW, AND MOM.LrrY 471, 479 (1960).
14. HART, supra note 2, at 2.
15. Particularly valuable is the Hart-Fuller debate. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 599 (1958); Fuller, supra note 13,
at 630. See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Oxford 1961).
16. See, e.g., J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LI.AL SYSTM (1970); Dworkin, Social
Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J 855 (1972); Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967); J.Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE
LJ.823 (1972).
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Hans Kelsen), and legal "realists" (like Jerome Frank) on the other,
throw considerable light on the import of a position like Thoreau's.
3. Evaluative and Normative Issues
Examples of evaluative-normative issues are: (a) Is law or a
system of law subject to moral criticism? (b) If so, by what standards?
(c) Under what circumstances, if any, can there be a moral right or
duty to disobey the law. A further question is this: (d) Does the fact
that certain conduct is viewed as immoral by prevailing community
standards justify, in and of itself, the imposition of criminal penalties?
In other terms, ought immorality, as such, to be punishable by law? 17
Inquiries of this type may be relevant to inquiries of the first type,
because a law that is regarded by a substantial proportion of the
people as manifestly unjust is likely to be ineffective and to encourage
disrespect rather than support for law in general. Yet the immediate
focus of evaluative-normative questions is different from that of causalfunctional questions. As applied to the American constitutional system, we are no longer asking how the system is to be preserved, but
whether it is worth preserving, or how to improve it so that it will become more clearly worth preserving. This, I submit, is probably the
most fundamental of all questions in the area of law and morals. It
is too important to be confused with-or hidden behind-other questions.
These three different kinds of questions should be kept in mind
an
examination of Professor Bennett's claim that Thoreau went "far
in
beyond the idea that law cannot create values, to the position that the
legal and moral domains are mutually exclusive."' 8
Did Thoreau assert the causal-functional independence of law and
morals. Clearly not. In fact he claimed just the opposite. His most
influential thesis, which influenced Gandhi as well as many radicals
here and abroad in the 1960's, was that passive resistance on moral
grounds could destroy the practical effectiveness of laws and bring
17. This last question, which is the subject of Mill's On Liberty, is addressed by
Hart in Law, Liberty, and Morality. See Hart, supra note 2. Among the extensive
recent discussions, Herbert Packer's The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968), is
especially significant. Although Professor Bennett does not deal with this problem, it
arises by necessity when concrete steps are taken to implement several of the values he
lists as basic, especially those concerned with respect for persons and the protection of
thought and speech.
18. Bennett, supra note 1, at 912.

HASTINGS CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 3

about change in the laws.' 9 Such a claim as this presupposes the functional dependence of law upon morality, at least in any democratic
society where the authorities take cognizance of the need for general
popular support to make laws practically effective. If Thoreau had believed that American laws were causally and functionally independent
of popular moral convictions, he could not have supposed that passive
resistance on moral grounds would be influential. "Wise law makers,"
Professor Hurst notes, "have shared Thoreau's perception that 'a minority . . is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight.' "20 He cites
a specific instance when Congress "yielded to the moral claims as well
as to the economic ambitions" of influential minorities,2 1 adding:
Thoreau reminds us that, at least in the kind of society we have
aspired to be, the force of law is marginal and must be husbanded,
and that when substantial numbers of people reach moral judgments that
22 differ with those embodied in law, the law is likely to
change.
Thoreau's position on this point is complementary to that of Judge
Learned Hand in the passage quoted by Professor Bennett at the beginning of his article.23 Judge Hand argued that if our system of laws
is to be preserved, it must have the active moral support of the people.24 Thoreau believed that active moral opposition would defeat the
system and induce change. These are not opposing positions; they are
two sides of the same coin.
If Thoreau thus recognized that morality affects law, did he nevertheless assert (as Professor Bennett seems to suppose) that law cannot
affect morality? Again the answer is no. Thoreau regarded the influence of the law on morality as significant, but primarily bad. He as19. "I know this well," he wrote, "that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men
whom I could name,--if ten honest men only-aye, if one HONEST man, in this State
of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in
America.....
"If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer
afflict the ear of the State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do
not know by how much truth is stronger than error ....
A minority is powerless
while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible
when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or
give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. . . ." Thoreau, On
the Duty of Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN AND CIvIL DISOBEDIENCE 222, 230-31 (Signet
ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Thoreau, Civil Disobedience].
20. Hurst, supra note 6, at 9.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 10.
23. See note 11 supra.
24. Bennett, supra note 1, at 899.
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serted quite explicitly that uncritical respect for law tended to dull the
moral sense and to encourage mechanical obedience and blind con-

formity.25 Thoreau may be open to criticism for having emphasized
the bad effects of law upon morality without allowing sufficiently for
the positive and constructive effects. But he was fully aware of a close
causal and functional interaction between law and morality.
Let us look now at the second type of question. Can Thoreau
be taken as asserting the analytical-conceptual independence of law
and morality? Again the answer must be negative. Thoreau's position
was rooted in his belief, which Professor Bennett fails to mention, that

there exists a higher law of rectitude and justice, not' made by any human fiat but discoverable intuitively by the conscientious mind, to
which all counsels of expediency, whether legal or moral, must be subordinated. 26 Thoreau stood in the venerable tradition of natural law,

in company with the fictional Antigone and with historical figures such
as Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, the subscribers to the Declara-

tion of Independence, and, in our own day, Martin Luther King. According to this view, which may take either a religious or a secularized
form, the domains of law and morality are not mutually exclusive;

rather, positive law falls within the sphere of morality, so that a law
that is morally unjust is invalid and cannot command obedience.
25. "It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right.
• .. Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even
the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice ...
"The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with
their bodies. . . . In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of
the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and
wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well." Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, supra note 19, at 223-24.
26. Thoreau's belief in the existence of higher laws transcending the norms of
positive morality as well as those of positive law is evident in Walden, notably in chapter
eleven, entitled Higher Laws. The same view is reflected in a number of passages in
Thoreau's Civil Disobedience: "It is not so important that many should be as good as
you, as that there be some absolute goodness somewhere; for that will leaven the whole
lump." Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, supra note 19, at 226. "Action from principlethe perception and the performance of right-changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with anything which was. It not only
divides States and churches, it divides families; ay, it divides the individual, separating
the diabolical in him from the divine." Id. at 228. "I do not hesitate to say, that those
who call themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually withdraw their support, both
in person and property, from the government of Massachusetts and not wait till they
constitute a majority of one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I
think that it is enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one.
Moreover, any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one
already." Id. at 229-30. Note that if the last sentence is taken out of its immediate
context, its import may be mistaken.
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Hence Professor Bennett's interpretation of Thoreau fails here, as it
failed in the causal-functional aspect.
Finally, in the context of evaluative-normative issues, can we say
that Thoreau separated law and morals in such a way as to exclude
moral criticism of law? A position of this sort was taken by the late
Hans Kelsen, who held that while legal norms can be objectively valid,
moral judgments are no more than emotive expressions of individual
feelings lacking objective validity. On this basis, Kelsen concluded
that it is logically impossible to assert the existence of a binding moral
obligation to disobey a duly enacted law.2 7 Whatever one thinks of
such a position, 2 it is the complete antithesis of Thoreau's. Thoreau
believed that moral criticism of law was obligatory; that objective moral
standards of right conduct and right legislation were to be found in
higher law; and that the conscientious citizen is under a moral duty to
disobey laws that work injustice to others.2" There were not, for him,
two mutually exclusive domains, but different levels of obligation reflecting higher and lower moral perspectives-the utilitarian perspective being insufficient. It should be stressed that for Thoreau, as his
criticism of Paley makes clear,"0 the higher demands of justice apply
equally to individuals, societies, and governments. There is not a
double standard, but a hierarchy of universal standards. It should be
noted also in this connection that Thoreau did not dismiss the American
constitutional system as morally valueless; he regarded it as good, but
from the higher moral perspective, notably imperfect:
Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its faults,
is very good; the law and the courts are very respectable; even this
State and this American government are, in many respects, very
admirable, and rare things, to be thankful for, such as a great many
27. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND THE STATE 374-75, 407-10 (1945).
28. Kelsen's view has been much criticized. See, e.g., A. Ross, DIRECTIVEs AND

NORMS 156-58 (1968) (suggesting that Kelsen later modified his view).
29. Thoreau held that some injustices do not warrant disobedience: "If the
injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it
go: perchance it will wear smooth . . . but if it is of such a nature that it requires you
to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law." Thoreau, Civil
Disobedience, supra note 19, at 229.
30. "Paley, a common authority with many on moral questions . . . resolves all
civil obligation into expediency .

. .

. But Paley appears never to have contemplated

those cases to which the rule of expediency does not apply, in which a people, as well as
an individual, must do justice, cost what it may. If I have unjustly wrested a plank from
a drowning man, I must restore it to him though I drown myself. This, according to
Paley, would be inconvenient. But he that would save his life, in such a case, shall lose
it. This people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost
them their existence as a people." - Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, supra note 19, at 225.
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have described them; but seen from a point of view a little higher,
they are what I have described them; seen from a higher still, and
they are worth
the highest, who shall say what
3 they are, or that
looking at or thinking of at all? '
It is evident that Thoreau, far from asserting the separation of law
and morality, asserted their interdependence in all three aspects. He
believed that there was close causal and functional interaction between
them, although, as regards the influence of law on values, he stressed
the bad effects only, ignoring the good. As a believer in higher law,
he stood in a tradition that conceived of law as falling conceptually
within the moral domain, subject to transcendent requirements of justice.
He firmly asserted that law ought to conform to the ultimate norms of
justice; it was on this basis that he justified disobedience to laws that
failed to meet the highest standards of morality. In sum, Professor
Bennett's interpretation misrepresents Thoreau on every essential
point.
H. Morality and Expediency
I turn now briefly to the second set of difficulties, namely those
arising from the looseness and shifting senses of ethical terms. I have
claimed that Professor Bennett has misrepresented Thoreau, but let us
assume that I am wrong and that Thoreau in fact held substantially the
views attributed to him. The question then arises: What is the significance of such views, as summarized by Professor Bennett? Consider
this statement on its own terms: "[Matters of expediency belong to
the law, while morality is found in the conscience of the individual.
'3' 2
•. . [Tjhe legal and moral domains are mutually exclusive.
Neither law nor morality designates any particular kind of action
or conduct; what law and morality both provide are rules and standards
for guiding and judging conduct. To say that "morality is found in the
conscience of the individual" must be taken to mean that the standards
of moral action and moral judgment are either made or discovered by
conscience.33 But to locate the standards in this way does not tell us
31. Id. at 238.
32. This is a composite of the opening and closing statements in Professor
Bennett's summary description of the position attributed to Thoreau. See Bennett, supra
note 1, at 911-12.
33. According to traditional theories of natural law and natural rights, the individual discovers through conscience (or "reason," the "moral sense," or "common sense") the
moral law ordained by God or Nature, but does not make it. The distinction between
discovering and making the moral law is of great importance, at least theoretically,
because on this view the basic rules of morality are given to all individuals equally and
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what the standards are. On the other hand, to speak of matters of expediency is apparently to speak of those acts, of whatever sort, that are
done from certain motives, with the purpose of securing some advantage. But to say that such actions "belong to the law" does not tell
us what standards the law applies or should apply in judging them.
Nor does it tell us what the law does, or should do, about actions done
from other motives, such as killing a man in a blind rage or torturing
an animal for the sheer enjoyment of its suffering. Are these matters
of expediency merely? It would seem not, yet the law forbids them,
and quite properly. The question is one of conflicting, or possibly
conflicting, standards and obligations. Yet these do not enter into
Professor Bennett's description. The result is that his supposed antithesis fails; the alternatives are neither coordinate, nor mutually exclusive, nor exhaustive. The morality of conscience might well approve
certain acts done because they were deemed "expedient," like exercising
personal self-discipline for the sake of health. And the law might well
aim at justice rather than merely seeking to maximize utility and economic advantage.
I suspect that Professor Bennett has been victimized by a metaphor-a metaphor apparently borrowed from Professor Hurst.3 4 I refer to the conception of law and morality as each having its own "domain." However, if "domain" signifies a range of application, the domains of law and morality largely overlap. Much conduct that is legally
prohibited is also morally condemned; much conduct that is morally
condemned is also legally prohibited. And the question whether the
law should prohibit conduct solely on the ground that it is considered
immoral under prevailing community standards is in large measure a
moral question. 5
There is a further difficulty about the term "expediency" when
it is used as an independent substantive. Expediency is relational; it
implies that something is conducive to something else. When expediency is contrasted with morality, it usually signifies something done for
the sake of some advantage or benefit to be gained, with the implication that a truly moral act should exclude all considerations of the
are uniform for all.

In this context, conscience (or "reason," the "moral sense," or

"common sense") is a cognitive faculty capable of moral intuition. As to the importance
of this tradition in 17th, 18th, and early 19th century thought, and as to Thoreau's place
in it, see S. LYND, INTELLECTUAL OmGiNS oF AMEICAN RADIcAusM (1968). It must be
emphasized that Thoreau, though a strong individualist, was not a proto-existentialist,
though sometimes so treated.
34. Hurst, supra note 6, at 37 (opposing the "domains" of humane values and law).
35. See note 17 supra.
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actor's self-interest. Such was Kant's position. But many other moral-

ists have held that certain kinds of self-interest are morally admissible,
even praise-worthy.

Still others, like the utilitarians, have made social

expediency the basis of all morality as well as law.
It appears from Thoreau's comments on Paley86 that while he rejected the utilitarian position, he did not go to the opposite Kantian

extreme. What he seems to have believed was that expediency is a
morally acceptable guide for ordinary purposes, but not when it would
7
allow or require an individual or a nation to do injustice to others.8
MI. Is Our Constitutional System Worth Preserving?
I noted earlier that there is an important difference between asking how our constitutional system is to be preserved and asking how
it is to be made more clearly worth preserving. It remains to say a
word about the latter question.
Nobody considers our present system of law perfect as it stands.
Certainly Judge Learned Hand did not. In an eloquent short article
on the value of civil liberties, 38 he reaffirmed the conviction that their
36. See note 30 supra.
37. Professor Hurst takes Thoreau's remark that government is "at best but an
expedient" in conjunction with his expressed wish for "a government in which majorities
decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable" as implying (in
Hurst's words) "that governmental procedures are legitimate only to decide 'these
questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable' while all questions of moral
content must be left to individual conscience." Hurst, supra note 6, at 13. I do not
think this follows. What Thoreau was attacking here was not law or government as
such, but majority rule where the majority was not sufficiently enlightened to follow the
guidance of conscience. What he wrote was: "But a government in which the majority
rule in all cases cannot be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. Can there
not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but
conscience?-in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of
expediency is applicable? Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree,
resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think
that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a
respect for the law, so much as for the right. .. " Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, supra
note 19, at 223.
Thoreau, while believing that "every man has a conscience," was distrustful of the
masses and of legislators generally, including Daniel Webster, because they failed to
heed, or to live by, the dictates of the higher law as manifested to conscience. If it be
objected that Thoreau had no right to treat himself as more conscientious than other
men, or than the average man, or than Daniel Webster, it should be noted that this
difficulty is common to all theories of natural law or higher law, when they are joined
with the right of private judgment. If we, on this account, reject higher law theories,
this does not justify our subtracting this view from Thoreau and then reconstructing his
view to cover the omission. It was Thoreau's devotion to higher law, as he saw it, which
led him to distrust what J.S. Mill called the tyranny of the majority, and to reject (in
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preservation depends more upon the spirit and moral temper of the
people than upon the Bill of Rights or upon the courts' interpretations.3 9 But he went on to make clear, as one reason for this belief,
that he viewed our basic constitutional principles not as eternal verities,
but as "the best postulates so far attainable." He went on to say:
[I]f at the end some friendly critic shall pass by and say, "My
friend, how good a job do you really think you have made of it
all?" we can answer, "I know as well as you that it is not of high
quality, but I did put into it whatever I had, and that was the game
I started out to play."
It is still in the lap of the gods whether a society can succeed
based on "civil liberties and human rights," conceived as I have
tried to describe them; but of one thing at least we may be sure:
the alternatives that have so far appeared have been immeasurably
worse, and so, whatever the outcome, I submit to you that we must
press along. Borrowing from Epictetus, let us say to ourselves:
"Since we are men we will play the part of a Man....1-40
Readers of Thoreau will recall his convergent admonition: "I think
that we should be men first and subjects afterward. 41 They will
recognize also that the fundamental difference between Thoreau's
moral stance and that of Judge Hand was that Thoreau invoked, while
Judge Hand rejected, the authority of higher laws of rectitude and justice, intuitively discoverable by conscientious minds, to which all
counsels of expediency, whether moral or legal, must give way. Measured by such transcendent standards, Thoreau found the American
constitutional system valuable but sufficiently imperfect to warrant civil
disobedience to remedy injustice. Judge Hand, the pragmatist,
stressed the positive values despite the imperfections. 42 The difference here is one of perspectives such as the difference between the
man who regrets that the glass of water is half empty and the man who
effect) the maxim, vox populi, vox Dei. But he shared the view expressed by Milton in
Areopagitica that the truth, if put forward, would eventually prevail over error. See note
19 supra.
38. Hand, Freedom of Dissent, N.Y. Times Mag., Feb. 16, 1955, reprinted in
BEYOND BERKELEY 419 (Katope & Zolbrod eds. 1966).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 424.
41. See note 37 supra.
42. I do not know whether Judge Hand specifically discussed civil disobedience, but
I should have expected him to agree largely with Thoreau's position, though on different
grounds. Although most defenders of civil disobedience as a morally defensible tactic
for securing the change of unjust laws have relied, like Thoreau, on some type of higher
law theory, it is possible to defend it on utilitarian or pragmatic grounds. See C. COHEN,
CIviL DISOBEDIENCE 102-28 (1971), for a review and critique of various grounds of
moral justification.
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is pleased that it is half full. Hand and Thoreau agreed in seeing the
American legal system as fragile and as depending for its continued
existence on the active moral support of the people. Although
Thoreau was in one respect more cynical, he was in another respect
perhaps more optimistic by virtue of his belief that the principles of
perfect justice are knowable and that moral truth, once publicly declared, will be recognized and will ultimately prevail.
A paragraph from the concluding chapter of Walden,4 3 which was
published in 1854, several years after the essay on civil disobedience, 4
may be regarded as reflecting Thoreau's considered view:
It is said that Mirabeau took to highway robbery "to ascertain
what degree of resolution was necessary in order to place one's self
in formal opposition to the most sacred laws of society." He declared that "a soldier who fights in the ranks does not require half
so much courage as a foot-pad,"-"that honor and religion have
never stood in the way of a well-considered and a firm resolve."
This was manly, as the world goes; and yet it was idle, if not desperate. A saner man would have found himself often enough "in
formal opposition" to what are deemed "the most sacred laws of
society," through obedience to yet more sacred laws, and so have
tested his resolution without going out of his way. It is not for a
man to put himself in such an attitude to society, but to maintain
himself in whatever attitude he find himself through obedience to
the laws of his being, which will never be one of opposition to a
just government, if he should chance to meet with such.45
My criticism of Thoreau is not that he separated law and government from morality but that he separated himself from law and government, disclaiming responsibility for the process of political design and
construction, while reserving the right to pass moral judgment upon the
result. The conscientious individual, he seems to say, should stand
aside from the institutions of society, withholding his cooperation until
they have been brought, by the labors of other people, up to the levels
of rectitude and justice prescribed by the laws of his own being. Having complained that "[sitatesmen and legislators, standing so com46
pletely within the institution, never distinctly and nakedly behold it,"
he takes his own stance outside the institution as a detached but critical
spectator. In one respect, this is admirable. The difficulty is that even
if there are natural principles of justice, written in heaven and manifest,
as he believed, to the mind of any conscientious individual willing to
43. H. THoREAu, Walden, in THE WoRKs OF THOREAU (H. Canby ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as THOREAU, Walden].
44. Thoreau, Civil Disobedience,supra note 19.
45. THoREAU, Walden, supra note 43, at 458 (emphasis added).
46. Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, supra note 19, at 238.
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take heed of them, just laws and just governments must still be fashioned, slowly and laboriously, by the efforts of fallible mortals-statesmen, legislators, and judges who are willing, like Judge Learned Hand,
to press forward step by step as best they can. If such principles of
justice are not thus divinely ordained but must be worked out, as Judge
Hand believed, by human trial and error, the task is far longer and
more uncertain. In either case, with legal systems as with other human
contrivances, preoccupation with the best can sometimes serve to discredit the good and prevent the achievement of the better.
There is good reason to see danger in public detachment from,
or public disillusion with, our constitutional principles, from whatever
cause such attitudes arise. This, apparently, is the danger that concerns Professor Bennett. It deserves the best attention we can give

